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WHAT HAS BECOME OF FORCED HEIRSHIP?

At one time forced heirship stood like a citadel among the institutions
of Louisiana private law.' Its impregnable walls offered limited egress
to the testator and loomed as an inhospitable barrier to that outsider,
the surviving spouse. The citadel contained draconian weapons with
which to wrest property from the hands of unsuspecting third parties.
Its menancing form intimidated the bravest of lawyers from foreign
lands, and even a few title examiners and estate planners within the
realm. Within its protection dwelt not only the innocent descendant but
almost all manner of dissolute, disobedient, and ungrateful child and
greedy parent. No wonder the citadel was assaulted.
The walls have not remained intact. An informed and unemotional
evaluation of forced heirship must not proceed with the old citadel in
mind, for the image of the old citadel only inflames and distorts. In
fact the Louisiana Trust Code, the 1981 amendments to the Civil Code,
and the 1981 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code have answered
most of the criticisms of forced heirship. Present law gives testators
much greater flexibility than they previously had in disposing of their
property, while protecting descendants in a more just and less cumbersome fashion than before. Further reform is still necessary, but the rules
of forced heirship today are much more closely tuned to modern society
than were their antecedents.
The New Legitime-Its Claimants and Its Size
Although the Louisiana constitution forbids the abolition of forced
heirship, it specifically empowers the legislature to decide who the forced
2
heirs are and how much they are entitled to claim as their legitime.
In 1981 the legislature exercised this power and eliminated parents as
forced heirs.3 Previously, if the decedent had no descendants his parents
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were forced heirs, sometimes for one-third, sometimes for one-fourth
of the estate.4 The elimination of ascendants' forced heirship seems to
have been acceptable to both proponents and opponents of forced heirship.' The justification offered was that social welfare programs were
sufficient to care for elderly ascendants. 6 Perhaps then it is no coincidence
that several countries with pervasive social welfare systems have, like
Louisiana, no forced heirship for ascendants while retaining it for descendants. 7 One wonders whether this country is as committed politically
to a welfare system as those countries, and whether in light of the
growing elderly population and the precarious financial condition of

Social Security and Medicare, reliance on social insurance to care for
elderly parents will prove ill-founded.
With parents eliminated as forced heirs, descendants are the only
category of forced heir still recognized in Louisiana.' In 1981 the size
of the disposable portion was changed for the first time since 1825. 9

Instead of a disposable portion of two-thirds (one child), one half (two
children), and one-third (three or more children), 0 the testator now may
dispose to anyone of three-fourths (one child) or one-half (two or more
children) of his estate." This was a significant move in the direction of
testamentary freedom. Louisiana's disposable portion is now among the

most generous of any of the jurisdictions having a forced share for
descendants., 2
Illegitimate children who have proven their filiation to the parent
are now included in the class of forced heirs. 3 In the discussion that
4. La. Civ. Code art. 1494 (1972 Comp. Ed., in 16 West's La. Stat. Ann.-Civ.
Code). In 1979 the parents' forced share was restricted to the decedent's separate property
only. 1979 La. Acts No. 778, § 1.
5. See Nathan, supra note 1, at 16; Lemann, In Defense of Forced Heirship, 52
Tul. L. Rev. 20, 26 (1977).
6. Nathan, supra note 1, at 16; Lemann, supra note 5, at 26.
7. See, e.g., Denmark: Inheritance Law, ch. 4, arts. 25-26; Norway: Inheritance
Law, art. 29; Sweden: Book of Successions, ch. 7, arts. 1-3.
8. La. Civ. Code art. 1493.
9. La. Civ. Code art. 1480 (1825). The Digest of 1808 provided for a disposable
portion of one fifth. See La. Digest of 1808 bk. II1, tit. 2, art. 19.
10. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (1972 comp. Ed., in 16 West's La. Stat. Ann.-Civ.
Code).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Codigo Civil (Argentina) arts. 1832, 3593-95, 3602 (one fifth); Inheritance
Law (Denmark) ch. 4, arts. 25-26 (one half); Code Civil (France) art. 913 (one child,
one half; two children, one third; three or more children, one fourth); BGB (Germany)
arts. 2303-2313, 2325-2329 (one half); Codice Civil (Italy) arts. 536-552 (one child, one
half; two children, one third; three or more children, one fourth); Inheritance Law
(Norway) ch. 4, art. 29 (one third, but forced portion can not exceed 500,000 Kroners
per child); Codigo Civil (Spain) arts. 806-809, 818-820 (one third); Book of Successions
(Sweden) ch. 7, arts. 1-3 (one half). These countries are a representative sample. There
are many more countries which have a forced share for descendants.
13. La. Civ. Code arts. 3556, 1493.
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accompanied the removal of discrimination against illegitimate children
from the intestacy rules in 1981, it did not go unnoticed that whereas
in other states a decedent may protect his estate from the potential
claims of illegitimate children by making a will; in Louisiana, despite
a will, the estate is still vulnerable to their claims. As a practical matter,
the chances of an illegitimate child claiming his rights as a forced heir
are severely curtailed by the stringent requirements for proof of filiation.
The child must either have been formally acknowledged by the parent,
or he must have proven his filiation in a civil suit brought within
nineteen years of his birth or one year of the parent's death, whichever
occurs first.'

4

If the parent has died, filiation must be proven by clear

and convincing evidence instead of the usual preponderance standard
for civil suits." 5 The deadlines for proving filiation and the higher standard of proof after the parent's death combine to minimize the risk that
unacknowledged illegitimate forced heirs will disrupt the decedent's estate
plan. There is still the chance that a formally acknowledged illegitimate
child, who is not cut off from the estate by the time periods for proving
filiation, will surface after the other heirs and legatees have obtained a
judgment of possession and transferred the decedent's immovable property. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5630 solves this problem by giving
third parties who have acquired an interest in immovable property by
onerous title from the heirs and legatees recognized in a judgment of
possession an acquisitive prescription of two years from the finality of
the judgment. 16 The unrecognized forced heir's rights may not thereafter
be asserted against the property, only against the co-heirs and legatees.
Also, property sold pursuant to an administration of the decedent's
estate would be immune to the claims of the unrecognized forced heir.
Thus the inclusion of illegitimate descendants as forced heirs does not,
practically speaking, increase the uncertainty of the devolution of property or of the title to immovable property. The spectre of illegitimate
forced heirs is not great enough to justify abolishing forced heirship
altogether in view of the proof of filiation requirements, prescription,
and the availability of administration.
Remedies
Prior to 1981, if a donation inter vivos of immovable property was
found to exceed the disposable portion, the forced heir, after discussing
the donee's other property, could exercise the remedy of revendication
against the donated property itself-even though the property had passed
14. La. Civ. Code art. 209.
15. Id.
16. La. R.S. 9:5630 (1983) shortened the prescription from ten years to two. The
prescription was made retroactive and accrues against minors, interdicts, and posthumous
children. La. R.S. 9:5631 (1983).
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from the donee to a purchaser for value.' 7 Thus a donation of immovable
property registered in the public records rendered title unmerchantable
until the forced heirs' rights had prescribed or it was clear that their
rights had been satisfied. To prevent title from becoming unmerchantable, donors of immovable property routinely disguised the donations
as sales so that a subsequent purchaser could rely on the public record.'
Under today's rules of forced heirship this disguise is no longer necessary.
The 1981 amendments eliminated the forced heir's right to revendicate

donated immovable property in the hands of a purchaser for value.' 9
Nor can the forced heir invalidate a mortgage placed on the property
by the donee, as was previously allowed. 2 These amendments are ret2
roactive. '
The elimination of the revendication remedy (and the short twoyear prescription under Revised Statutes 9:5630 on property conveyed
by heirs or legatees) has virtually converted the forced heirs' remedies
into a personal action by the forced heir against the donee or legatee

for the value of the legitime. 22 No longer must third parties wait for
prescription to cure title defects caused by potential revendication. Nor
must donors of immovable property resort to subterfuge to keep title

merchantable.

23

But the loss of the revendication remedy does not render

forced heirship an empty right. First, wealth today consists of movable
property to a larger extent than before. 24 There never was a revendication
remedy for donated movable property; 5 yet, no one has argued, despite
17. La. Civ. Code art. 1517 (1972 Comp. Ed., in 16 West's La. Stat. Ann.-Civ.
Code). Property revendicated by the forced heir came back to the succession free of any
mortgages created by the donee. Id. art. 1516.
18. Nathan, supra note 1, at 14.
19. La. Civ. Code arts. 1517-1518.
20. Cf. Civil Code article 1516, as it appeared before and after the 1981 amendment.
Similar amendments were made for the revendication remedy for collation of immovable
property. La. Civ. Code arts. 1270, 1264, 1281.
21. La. R.S. 9:5811 (1981).
22. See La. Civ. Code art. 1517. Collation, an action by a forced heir against his
co-forced heirs, is likewise now virtually a personal action. See supra note 20. Only if
the property is still in the possession of the donee or legatee or their successors by
gratuitous title does the forced heir have a claim to the property itself.
23. The revendication remedy pertaining to donations omnium bonorun was abolished
in 1982. La. Civ. Code art. 1497 (Supp. 1984). Thus forced heirship causes no more title
problems for inter vivos donations of immovables.
24.
The bulk of modern wealth takes the form of contract rights rather than
rights in rem-promises rather than things. The recent boom in residential real
estate and collectibles should not obscure this point. Promissory instrumentsstocks, bonds, mutual funds, bank deposits, and pension and insurance rightsare the dominant component of today's wealth.
Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 Harv.
L. Rev. 1108, 1119 (1984).
25. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1516, 1517, 1284 (1972 Comp. Ed., in 16 West's La.
Stat. Ann.-Civ. Code).
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the growing importance of movables, that forced heirship was ineffective
because it lacked such a remedy.2 6 So in personam remedies should be
sufficient for donated immovable property as well. Second, the existence
of even an in personam remedy is enough to encourage voluntary compliance. Most donor-testators will plan in advance for the satisfaction
of the legitime despite the forced heir's lack of a revendication remedy.
Finally, from the standpoint of fairness the revendication remedy left
something to be desired. It put the risk of a donee's or legatee's
insolvency on a third party who paid value for the property. Arguably
it is better for the forced heir to be paid his legitime only by those
who were the objects of the decedent's bounty, not by those who
subsequently acquired the property by paying for it. The abolition of
the revendication remedy for donations of immovables demonstrates that
the various problems attending forced heirship can be addressed without
abolishing the institution in its entirety. While not significantly endangering the effectiveness of forced heirship, the amendments have confined
the reach of forced heirship to those who are the objects of the decedent's
bounty, whose interest, since they have paid nothing for their donations
or legacies, may be fairly subordinated to the social policy implicit in
forced heirship.
Burdens on the Legitime
One of the cardinal rules of forced heirship is that the testator
cannot place charges or conditions on the legitime. 217 The forced heir is
entitled to his legitime in full ownership. 2 The forced heir may be given
the disposable portion conditioned on his accepting charges or conditions
on his legitime, but he has the option of abandoning the disposable
29
portion and taking his legitime free and clear.
There are two giant exceptions to this rule. One is that the decedent
is permitted to put the legitime in trust.30 By the device of a legitime
trust the decedent can effectively keep the forced heir from touching
the capital of the legitime throughout the forced heir's life." The decedent can forbid alienation by the forced heir of his interest in the
trust 32 and can even specify that if the forced heir dies intestate and
without descendants, his legitime is to go to another person designated

26. We are speaking here of remedies against the property that is subject to the
forced heirs' claims. As will be seen, forced heirship has been weakened by exempting
certain property from the reach of forced heirship altogether.
27. La. Civ. Code art. 1710.
28. Succession of Williams, 184 So. 2d 70 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
250 La. 748, 199 So. 2d 183 (1967).
29. Succession of Turnell, 32 La. Ann. 12i8 (1880). See La. Civ. Code art. 1499.
30. La. R.S. 9:1841 (1984).
31. Id.
32. La. R.S. 9:1843 (1965).

580

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

by the decedent. 3 Thus the legitime trust is a useful device both for
the devoted parent who wants to see that the legitime assets are providently spent for the forced heir's benefit and for the parent who, for
whatever motive, wants to keep control of the legitime away from the
forced heir. In either case, the legitime trust does not thwart the purpose
of forced heirship, because the forced heir must receive the present
benefits of the legitime and has testamentary power over it. 4 The availability of this device, in the opinion of at least one notable authority,
obviates any need for the abolition of forced heirship. 5
The second exception is the usufruct of the surviving spouse. Though
technically neither a charge nor a condition, a usufruct over the legitime
is generally an impermissible burden upon it.36 But if the forced heir
has, in addition to his legitime, received the disposable portion or the
naked ownership of it, he can obtain his legitime free of the usufruct
by abandoning the disposable portion to the usufructuary.17 Thus the
testator may induce the forced heir to suffer a usufruct over his legitime
by giving him enough of the disposable portion to make its forfeiture
too great a sacrifice. But it is the forced heir's choice; he cannot be
forced to accept a usufruct over his legitime.
This rule is subject to the large exception concerning the usufruct
of the surviving spouse. Beginning with Succession of Moore39 the testator
was allowed to leave his spouse both the disposable portion and a
usufruct over the community property included in the legitime. The
court's reasoning was that the usufruct over community property was
the equivalent of the intestacy usufruct of the surviving spouse, and
therefore the usufruct had been imposed by law rather than by the
testator. The Moore court disregarded the fact that in an intestacy
situation where a spouse survives, the forced heirs received the naked
ownership of both the disposable portion and the legitime. Moore taught
that despite the fact that someone other than the forced heir received
the disposable portion, the forced heir could be made to suffer a usufruct
over his legitime in favor of the surviving spouse under the same terms
as the intestacy usufruct of the surviving spouse. Thus began the doctrine
of "confirmation" by testament of the legal usufruct of the surviving
spouse.
Over the years the doctrine of confirmation of the usufruct of the
surviving spouse has been codified and expanded. It is presently found

33.
34.

La. R.S. 9:1841(2) (1984).
La. R.S. 9:1841(1) (1984).

35.

Lemann, supra note 5, at 25.

36.
37.
38.
67, 96

Clarkson v. Clarkson, 13 La. Ann. 422 (1858).
La. Civ. Code art. 1499; Succession of Hyde, 292 So. 2d 693 (La. 1974).
40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888), followed in Winsberg v. Winsberg, 233 La.
So. 2d 44 (1957).
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in Civil Code article 890. The article states that any usufruct it authorizes
is to be treated as a legal usufruct and is not an impingement on the
legitime.3 9 What is authorized is a very broad usufruct in favor of the
surviving spouse: the testator may leave the surviving spouse the usufruct
for life of all of his property, both separate and community, even if
the naked owners are not issue of the marriage with the surviving
spouse. 40 Forced heirs who are not issue of the marriage with the
surviving spouse may demand security from the surviving spouse. 4 1
The effect of article 890 bears repeating. Not only may the decedent
leave the surviving spouse the disposable portion (at least half of the
estate, and if there is only one child, three-fourths), but a usufruct over
the rest for life. It must also be remembered that if the surviving spouse
and the decedent were living under a matrimonial regime of community
property, as are most spouses in Louisiana, the surviving spouse owns
one half of the former community. Thus if a married person with two
children has only community property and gives the surviving spouse
the maximum allowed by article 890, the surviving spouse will be full
owner of three-fourths of all their property, and usufructuary for life
42
of the remaining fourth.
Yet the complaint is still heard that this scheme is unfair to the
surviving spouse. Apparently nothing will do until the testator is free
to dispose of his entire estate in full ownership to the surviving spouse.
To decide whether the complaint has merit, one must first examine
whether holding part of the property in usufruct causes any serious
disadvantage to the surviving spouse's enjoyment of the property.
The usufructary receives all attributes of ownership necessary for
the present employment of the property, except the power to dispose
of nonconsumable property, including the possession, use, and revenue
of the property. 43 The limitation on the usufructuary's power to dispose
has been indicted as a cause of deadlock between the surviving spouse
and forced heirs. For example, assume the surviving spouse usufructuary

39. La. Civ. Code art. 890. The trust code provides that the legitime in trust may
be burdened with an income interest in favor of the surviving spouse to the same extent
and for the same term as a usufruct may be created in favor of the surviving spouse.
La. R.S. 9:1844 (1984).
40. La. Civ. Code art. 890.
41. Id.; La. Code Civ. P. art. 3154.1. Civil Code article 890 also provides that
security can be demanded whenever the usufruct covers separate property.
42. If the decedent also has separate property, he may leave the surviving spouse
the disposable portion of this property (three-fourths if one child, one-half if two or
more children), and usufruct of the rest.
43. La. Civ. Code arts. 535-568. The usufructuary has the power to dispose of
consumable property but owes a like amount to the naked owner at the end of the
usufruct. Since the day of reckoning for having disposed of consumable property comes
later, at the end of the usufruct, it does not impair the usufructuary's ability to derive
the present benefit from the property.
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wishes to sell the large family home and move to smaller quarters. The
naked owners do not want to sell because they fancy moving into the
house when the usufruct is over. The naked owners are unwilling to
end the usufruct by paying the usufructuary the present value of the
usufruct. Thus, goes the argument, the surviving spouse is stuck with
a white elephant.
In the first place, if the surviving spouse usufructuary is also the
full owner of an undivided interest in the property, a 1983 amendment
to article 543 permits the surviving spouse to seek a judicial partition
by licitation." The surviving spouse will then have a usufruct over the
proceeds of the partition sale. 45 Any time the property subject to usufruct
was community property, the surviving spouse will be the full owner
of an undivided one-half interest, and can demand partition under article
543. Moreover, article 543 protects the surviving spouse usufructuary
from being ousted by the naked owners by providing that those whose
share is only in naked ownership cannot force a partition. Thus, the
breaking of any deadlock is entirely up to the surviving spouse. Any
time the testator leaves the surviving spouse the disposable portion in
full ownership and the rest in usufruct, the spouse will meet the requirements of article 543 because the spouse will have full ownership
of an undivided interest. Thus, if the family home is the testator's
separate property, he may avoid any potential deadlock by leaving the
surviving spouse the disposable portion of the property in full ownership
and usufruct of the rest. Since article 543 does not require that the
undivided interest in full ownership be of any particular size, a small
fractional interest given to the spouse in full ownership would, absent
abuse of right, suffice to empower the usufructuary spouse to seek
partition.
Second, the surviving spouse usufructuary has the right to grant a
lease on the property; the spouse is not forced to choose between living
there and letting the property stand vacant. Perhaps the mere threat of
renting the property to strangers will often be sufficient to bring about
compromise with the naked owners. But in some cases the rental alternative may not be very practical. Since a lease granted by a usufructuary ends when the usufruct ends, a lessee seeking a long-term lease
would usually be reluctant to lease the property.
Third, depending on the value of other assets in the estate, the
decedent might be able to leave the family home in its entirety to the
surviving spouse as part of the disposable portion. Or the home, even
if part of the legitime, could be put in trust, so that an independent
trustee could determine whether the property should be sold.
Finally, Louisiana Civil Code article 568 permits the testator to grant

44.
45.

See La. Civ. Code art. 543, comment (c).
La. Civ. Code art. 616.
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the usufructuary the power to dispose of nonconsumable property. 46
However, it is not clear whether, if the usufructuary were given this
power over nonconsumable property included in the legitime, the usufruct
would be treated as a nonimpinging legal usufruct. On the one hand,
article 890 says that "a usufruct authorized by this Article is to be
treated as a legal usufruct and is not an impingement on the legitime."
It can be argued that the usufruct of which the article speaks is a
usufruct to the surviving spouse over property inherited by descendants.
The details of the rights and duties of the usufructuary are relegated
to the articles on usufruct, of which article 568 is one. Since the power
to dispose of nonconsumable property may be given to a usufructuary
under article 568, it is likewise authorized under article 890. On the
other hand, the judicial interpretation of old article 916, the predecessor
of current article 890, leads to the opposite conclusion. Under article
916 the courts had reasoned that when a testament granted the surviving
spouse a usufruct equivalent to the intestacy usufruct of the surviving
spouse, the usufruct did not impinge on the legitime.4 7 The intestacy
usufruct does not give the usufructuary the power to dispose of nonconsumables. Article 890 permits the testator to deviate in certain specific
respects from the intestacy usufruct, but the power to dispose of nonconsumable property is not one of the deviations specifically permitted
by article 890. Thus, the question is whether, in light of the history of
article 890, the legislature intended to permit only those deviations from
the intestacy usufruct that are specifically mentioned in article 890 or
others as well.
It thus appears that with appropriate planning the surviving spouse
can be given the upper hand over the forced heirs concerning property
subject to usufruct. The surviving spouse may be given not only possession and revenue for life, but also the power to change the nature
of the property without losing the usufruct. The testator can give the
surviving spouse this power either by creating the circumstances entitling
the surviving spouse to provoke a partition or, if article 890 be so
interpreted, by giving the surviving spouse the power to dispose of
nonconsumable property. When one considers that a testament may now
grant the surviving spouse a usufruct over the entire estate, the surviving
spouse may be given everything necessary for the present enjoyment of
all the decedent's property. Due to the legislative developments since
1981, which put the surviving spouse in the driver's seat for the present
enjoyment of the property, the risk of the legitime being uncollectable
46.

La. Civ. Code art. 568.

47. Thus when the testator attempted to give the surviving spouse a usufruct for life
over the legitime, the usufruct was held to impinge the legitime after the surviving spouse
remarried. Succession of Waldron, 323 So. 2d 434 (La. 1975). The legislature amended
article 916 (now 890) specifically to permit such lifetime usufructs. See La. Civ. Code
art. 1890.
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at the end of the usufruct is entirely on the forced heirs, not all of
whom are entitled to demand security.
A third, less significant exception to the rule that no conditions
may be placed on the legitime was added in 1984. Act 957 of 1984
amended Civil Code article 1521 to provide that the testator may impose
a suspensive condition on the legitime that the forced heir survive the
testator for a period not to exceed thirty days, in default of which a
third person may be designated to take the legitime. 41 By means of this
condition the testator can prevent the legitime from being transmitted
to the forced heir's heirs or legatees in a situation where the forced
heir has not lived long enough to enjoy the legitime himself. The
condition also would prevent an argument for taxation of the property
in the forced heir's estate should he die within thirty days of the testator.
Yet it is hoped that testators will use the condition with caution. The
amendment does not require that if the forced heir has children, they
be named the alternate takers. Apparently anyone can be named to take
in default of the forced heir, whether or not the forced heir has descendants. 49 If someone else is named, and the forced heir's children are
so unfortunate as to lose their parent shortly after they lose their
grandparent, this misfortune is compounded by the loss of their parent's
legitime. Absent the condition, the grandchildren would have had their
parent's legitime by transmission. 0
Property Not Subject to the Rules of Forced Heirship
Whether the donor or testator seeks to satisfy the legitime or to
avoid satisfying the legitime, he has greater flexibility after legislation
passed in 1981. Avoidance is facilitated by the exemption of many
common gratuitous transactions from the rules peculiar to forced heirship. The 1981 amendments to article 1505 codified the jurisprudential
rule exempting life insurance proceeds from the reach of forced heirs, 5
and created a similar exemption to cover benefits payable by reason of
48. 1984 La. Acts, No. 957, § 1, amending La. Civ. Code art. 1521. Baten v. Taylor,
386 So. 2d 333 (La. 1979), permitted such a condition on a universal legacy that did not
involve the legitime.
49. Cf. La. R.S. 9:1973 (1984) (declaring that shifting interest in principal can take
place only if beneficiary dies intestate and without descendants).
50. But see Succession of Henican, 248 So. 2d 385 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied,
259 La. 756, 252 So. 2d 454 (La. 1971), where a creditor of the forced heir was not
allowed to assert the forced heir's right to reduce excessive donations. One implication
of the case is that the forced heir's right is personal to him. If this conclusion is correct,
the right to reduce excessive donations may not be transmissible.
51. The jurisprudential rule exempted proceeds paid to a named beneficiary. See
Ticker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 Orl. App. 55 (1914). The amendment to article
1505 appears to exempt all proceeds from insurance on the life of the decendent, even
if payable to the estate. See La. Civ. Code art. 1505(c).
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death, disability, retirement, or termination of employment under most
deferred compensation or pension plans.12 Subsequent amendments exempted the premiums paid for such life insurance53 and the employer
and employee contributions to such plans54 from the claims of forced
heirs. Gifts to charitable, educational, or religious organizations are
immune to claims by forced heirs if made more than three years prior
to the donor's death," as are gifts to a spouse of a previous marriage
made during that marriage, 6 and donations to descendants when each
forced heir and the root represented by each forced heir have received
the same value in donations during the calendar year. 7 Furthermore,
none of the property subject to these exemptions is fictitiously added
to the active mass; the value of the exempted property does not increase
the size of the legitime. s
An available, but less practical, device for avoiding forced heirship
is that of acquiring real estate out of state.5 9 Another means surfaced
recently when the highest court of New York, applying a New York
statute permitting non-resident testators to designate New York law to
govern the disposition of property located in New York, rejected the
claim of a forced heir under French law to have his legiftime satisfied
from movable property located in New York. 60 The testator, a resident
of France but a citizen of the United States who for many years had
resided in New York, stated in her will that the disposition of her "New
York property" was to be governed by New York law. The forced heir
was a resident of California and a citizen of both France and the United
States. While the facts of that case did not give the forced heir the
strongest case under modern choice of law analysis, the decision does
suggest New York as a possible venue to locate assets to avoid forced
heirship.
For those testators who wish to satisfy the legitime, the recent
amendments to article 1505 specify that a forced heir who is the beneficiary of life insurance proceeds or pension plan death benefits must
credit them toward his legitime. 6' This alternative provides a practical

52. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(d). This amendment legislatively reversed the holding of
T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
53. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(c).
54.. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(d).
55. La. R.S. 9:2372 (1981).
56. La. R.S. 9:2354 (1981).
57. La. Civ. Code art. 1502.
58. See legislation cited supra notes 49-55.
59. See Hughes v. Hughes, 14 La. Ann. 85 (1859).
60. In re Renard, 108 Misc. 2d 31, 437 N.Y.S.2d 860 (Sup. Ct. 1981), aff'd mem.,
85 A.D.2d 501, 447 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1981), aff'd mem., 56 N.Y.2d 973, 439 N.E.2d 341,
453 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1982).
61. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(c), (d).
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way to satisfy the legitime with specific assets so as to allow other assets
to be disposable. This course might be desirable, for example, where a
testator wishes to leave the family business to the child who has worked
in it and assets of equal value to the other children. 62 The other children
may be given insurance proceeds to satisfy their legitime. It may be
that the decedent's assets are hard to value at the time he makes his
will. He may avoid impingement by making fractional legacies to the
forced heirs and, thanks to a recent amendment of articles 1573 and
1302, empower his executor to choose specific property to satisfy each
legacy.63 Of course, the testator himself may specify which assets shall
be used to satisfy the legitime. 64 Thus, with proper planning the legitime
should not hinder a parent's allocating particular property among the
heirs.
Estate Taxation
Prior to 1981, opponents of forced heirship pointed out that the
legitime prevented decedents from taking full advantage of the federal
estate tax marital deduction. 6 Legacies of property in full ownership to
the surviving spouse qualify for the marital deduction, but in Louisiana
such legacies were limited by the requirements of the legitime. Louisiana
did permit the testator to leave the surviving spouse a usufruct for life,
or a similar income interest in trust over the legitime, but such terminable
interests did not qualify for the marital deduction. In 1981 Congress
introduced the concept of "qualified terminable interest property" (QTIP)
into the Internal Revenue Code. 66 Under the QTIP provisions a surviving
spouse's lifetime income interest in property can qualify for the marital
deduction. The income interest can be in trust or any similar lifetime
income interest, such as a usufruct of the surviving spouse confirmed
for life.6 7 As long as QTIP remains in the Internal Revenue Code, there
can be no tax argument against forced heirship with respect to the
marital deduction. Furthermore, in 1981 Congress increased the amount
62. See Nathan, supra note 1, at 16.
63. La. Civ. Code arts. 1573, 1302.
64. La. Civ. Code art. 1302.
65. Nathan, supra note 1, at 18; LeVan, Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 Tul.
L. Rev. 29, 47 (1977).
66. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, tit. IV, subtit.
A, § 403(d), 95 stat. 172, 301 (codified in IRC § 2056(b)(7) & (8)).
67. Tax Reform Act of 1984 § 1027(a) amended the QTIP provisions to state specifically that a usufruct interest for life qualifies for QTIP treatment. There may be a
slight marital deduction problem with a usufruct where the property, other than a residence,
is converted from a non-productive asset to a productive one, for example, by selling it;
the property may not qualify for the deduction because the surviving spouse arguably
does not have an absolute right to the income for life, one of the requirements of the
deduction. IRC § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(I). Perhaps if the usufructuary has the right to partition
under Civil Code article 543, he will be considered as having the power to convert a
non-productive asset.
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of property that a person can gratuitously transfer free of tax to anyone
he chooses. For decedents dying after December 31, 1986 the amount
will be $600,000.6 Thus a married couple, all of whose property is
community, must amass more than $1,200,000 before they have any
federal estate tax worries at all. The potential tax problems of millionaire
decedents do not justify abolishing forced heirship. 69 Tax law may not
always stay the same, but as it presently stands it provides no argument
for abolishing forced heirship.
Problems Yet to be Solved
Louisiana's law of forced heirship is still vulnerable to the charges
that the rules on valuation of assets are conflicting and arbitrary, 70 and
that some of the grounds for disinherison are archaic."' Perhaps in the
light of modern choice of law theories the rule that Louisiana's law of
forced heirship applies to real property located in Louisiana even if
owned by a non-Louisiana decedent and claimed by non-Louisiana heirs
ought to be reconsidered. 72 These remaining problems are amenable to
legislative solution; they are not of such magnitude as to justify rejecting
forced heirship entirely. Unfortunately, no one will enthusiastically commit much time and effort to Solving them while there remains a real
chance that the whole institution might be eliminated.
WHAT WILL BECOME OF FORCED HEIRSHIP?

The choices facing the people of Louisiana are three: abolish forced
heirship, retain the present system, or create another remedy for abuse
of testamentary freedom. The first choice, to allow complete freedom
of testation, implies that there is no such thing as abuse of testamentary
freedom, that at death a person ought to be able to distribute his
property as if his family did not exist. This approach can lead to
intolerable results, as where there are needy children, and is inconsistent
with the rest of Louisiana's civil law. Even most opponents of forced
heirship do not advocate absolute testamentary freedom. 73 The third
68. See IRC § 2010. The unified credit of $192,800 available to those decedents is
the equivalent of an exemption from tax of $600,000 of property.
69. Even if Congress were to keep the exemption where it is for decedents dying in
1984, $325,000, a relatively small number of estates will incur federal taxes, particularly
if inflation remains low.
70. Nathan, supra note I, at 9-10.
71. Id. at 12. See infra text accompanying note 6.
72. Nathan, supra note 1, at 8, 18. This approach would be especially useful if it
encouraged other states to apply Louisiana law to property owned by Louisiana decedents
and claimed by Louisiana forced heirs.
73. Nathan, supra note 1, at 6 (recognizing that testamentary freedom should be
subject to appropriate limitations as to public policy and morality); LeVan, supra note

65, at 48 (proposing family maintenance as the alternative to forced heirship).
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approach precisely aims at abuse resulting from absolute freedom of
testation, but at the cost of increased litigation and increased uncertainty
in estate planning. The second choice, preserving the status quo, prevents
abuse of testamentary freedom while minimizing litigation and uncertainty. But to some the drawback of the present system is that it prevents
not only abuse, but also legitimate exercise of testamentary freedom.
Abolition of Forced Heirship
In legislative hearings and other public discussions on forced heirship,
the argument to abolish forced heirship usually proceeds from the assertion, "It's my property, I worked hard for it, and I ought to be
able to decide what happens to it." Private property and freedom of
disposition do have something in common: both respond to the same
human need to provide a better life for oneself and one's family. But
they are not linked together by an indisputable rule of natural law.
Every society recognizes limitations on private ownership, and though
all societies permit some kind of inheritance, they do not agree on the
extent to which the owner can choose his successors. 74 Louisiana's civil
law generally, not just its law of forced heirship, reflects a compromise
between private ownership and freedom of disposition. The Civil Code
repeatedly demonstrates that the power of an owner to deal with his
property must at times be restricted for the good of society.
The redactors of the French Code Civil, in their zeal to incorporate
liberty and equality into the principles of private law, did not forget
fraternity. Men and women live in society, and the redactors sought to
articulate the principles of an orderly, just society. To this end a person's
freedom to deal with his property was hedged with certain restrictions
forcing the individual to act decently toward his fellows.
Likewise, in the Louisiana Civil Code the spirit of individualism is
strong, but not rampant. Even in the area of obligations, where the
individual's autonomy is the strongest, there is the limitation that individuals may not by their contracts derogate from the rules made for
the preservation of public order and good morals. 75 The nullity of
contractual waivers of alimony pendente lite7 6 and of waivers of the
marital portion77 are examples. The donation inter vivos of all of one's
property is prohibited because of the fear of the public burden of
78
supporting the destitute donor.
Other examples of prohibitions on the gratuitous disposition of
74. Halback, Introduction, in ABA Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law, Death, Taxes and Family Property 4 (1977).
75. La. Civ. Code art. 11.
76. Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978).
77. La. Civ. Code art. 2330.
78. La. Civ. Code art. 1497.
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property where such dispositions are considered detrimental to society
include the prohibition against substitutions; 79 the prohibition against
imposing impossible, illegal, or immoral conditions on the gift;80 the
prohibition against donations between persons living in open concubinage;8" the prohibition against donations to doctors and ministers attending
a person during his last illness;8 2 the prohibition against donations to
aliens whose country prohibits dispositions in favor of a citizen of this
84
state; 83 and the prohibition against donations by minors to their tutors.
More extensive limitations on an individual's actions are found in the
law of delict 85 and quasi-contract, 8 6 both of which compel the individual
to do the decent thing (e.g., repair the damage he has caused, pay back
the money that was not due) despite his unwillingness to do so.
In the realm of property law, restrictions on an individual's autonomy are vital. As Professor Yiannopoulos states: "Laws which determine
property rights, their limits, and effects, are too closely connected with
the social organization to permit derogation by private agreement. The
regime of property, therefore, is governed for the most part by mandatory rules of law."8 s7 Thus, an owner, although entitled to "direct,
immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing," 8 cannot create tenures
in his property inconsistent with the real rights recognized in the Civil
Code, make the property inalienable, 9 or designate future owners of
the property in perpetuity. 90 Although the owner has the widest possible
rights to enjoy his property, the Code imposes certain servitudes to
insure that his enjoyment of his property will not defeat that of his
neighbor. 9'
The alimentary obligations imposed by family law are yet another
instance in which the law forces an individual to accept financial responsibility despite his will not to do so. If one has a spouse and
children one is obligated to support them. 92 Enforcement may be difficult
as a practical matter, but alimony and child support awards are nothing
if not limitations on the disposition of the obligor's hard-earned income.
79. La. Civ. Code art. 1500.
80. La. Civ. Code art. 1519.
81. La. Civ. Code art. 1481.
82. La. Civ. Code art. 1489.
83. La. Civ. Code art. 1490.
84. La. Civ. Code art. 1478; see also La. Civ. Code art. 1479.
85. La. Civ. Code art. 2315 expresses eloquently and succinctly the limit of individual
autonomy: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by
whose fault it happened to repair it."
86. La. Civ. Code arts. 2293-2313.
87. A. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law System 146 (1971),
88. La. Civ. Code art. 477.
89. A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 87, at 146.
90. La. Civ. Code art. 1520.
91. La. Civ. Code art. 655-696.
92. La. Civ. Code arts. 148, 160, 227.
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The community of acquets and gains, an institution that, like forced
heirship, concerns both family and property, illustrates the kind of
restrictions the Code places on private ownership where family interests
are considered paramount. Although the spouses may shun the community regime by making a matrimonial agreement to that effect, the
community regime is still relevant to this discussion. It is, after all, the
marital property regime that the Code deems the most equitable since
it is the regime that is applied automatically to spouses in the absence
of a matrimonial agreement. 93 Significantly, the community regime is
the antithesis of "It's my property, I worked hard for it, so I should
decide what happens to it." In the community regime, regardless of
which spouse acquires the property onerously, each spouse owns an
undivided one-half interest. 94 The legislature as recently as 1977 rejected
a proposal that the spouse who acquired the community property have
control over it, 91 in favor of a general rule of equal management by
both spouses, and equal power in each spouse to obligate all community
property.9
The community property example illustrates that in the family context, Louisiana law shows a preference for sharing both ownership and
control. The spouse who did not acquire the community property bears
some resemblance to the forced heir because that spouse receives a fixed
share whether that spouse deserves or needs it. Yet no one is proposing
to abolish community property because it restricts the individual's power
to own and to deal with his property. Community property seems
acceptable even though Louisiana's approach to marital property is in
marked contrast to the non-community property states, which do not
recognize any such restrictions on ownership and control during marriage.9 7 Admittedly the social policy justifying community property is
93. La. Civ. Code art. 2328. The legislature's preference for the community regime
is also evident in the requirement of court approval for deviations from the regime made
by matrimonial agreement during the marriage, yet no court approval is necessary for
the adoption of the community regime during marriage. La. Civ. Code art 2329.
94. La. Civ. Code arts. 2336, 2338.
95. Spaht, Background of Matrimonial Regimes Revision, 39 La. L. Rev. 323, 33136 (1979).
96. La. Civ. Code arts. 2345-2346. Only in the cases of community movable property,
the ownership of which is registered in a spouse's name as required by law, and movable
assets of a community business operated by one spouse alone, would the spouse who
acquired the property have sole control over onerous disposition. See La. Civ. Code arts.
2350-2351. Most donations of community property, and all alienations, mortgages, and
leases of community real estate require the concurrence of the spouses regardless of which
spouse acquired the property. While it can not be denied that the exception for management
of titled movables is an important one, the predominant management scheme, including
the power to obligate community property, is one that disregards which spouse acquired
the community property.
97. See W. Reppy & C. Samuel, Community Property in'the United States 1-11 (2d
ed. 1982). On divorce the trend in non-community states is to give the judges discretion
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different from that justifying forced heirship. The point here is simply
that if the principle of "It's my property, I worked hard for it, so I
should decide what happens to it" is controlling, then it follows that
Louisiana should abandon not only forced heirship, but also community
property, alimony and child support, the rules prohibiting substitutions
and other gratuitous dispositions,9" and the other limitations on freedom
of disposition imposed for the good of society. Once it is recognized
that limitations on freedom of disposition are and always will be necessary for the good of society, the inquiry can properly be focused on
whether there is a modern social purpose justifying a forced share for
descendants.
The Legitime: Historical Perspective and the Underlying Purposes
Throughout the history of western civilization, ownership, property,
family, clan, tribe, state, and nation have been inextricably intertwined.
The institution of the legitime developed during that period whence "the
memory of man runneth not to the contrary." Development of the
legitime under Roman law and its successor systems has been described
elsewhere. 99 Even among the early Germanic tribes and in ancient England, an analogous institution known as "birthright" guaranteed children
a portion of the family property:
Now that such rights once existed in England and many other
parts of Western Europe is not to be denied. When the dark
age is over, they rarely went beyond this, that the landholder
could not utterly disinherit his expectant heirs either by will or
by conveyance; the father, for example, could not sell or give
away the ancestral land without the consent of his sons, or
could only dispose of some "reasonable" part of it. If he
attempted to do more, then when he was dead his sons could
revoke the land. However, it was not unknown in some parts
of Germany that, even while the father- lived, the sons could
enforce their rights and compel him to a partition.' °°
If the legitime is of such ancient and universal lineage, would it not
be wise to inquire as to what purposes it served during its long and
distinguished history? We do not have to be Darwinians to know that
to order the spouses to share all or some of their property. This concept of equitable
distribution does not have any effect during the marriage. It does not make the spouses
co-owners, or restrict a spouse's control over property he acquires.
98. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
99. Dainow, Forced Heirship in French Law, 2 La. L. Rev. 669 (1940) [hereinafter
cited as Dainow, Forced Heirship]; Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship: Its
History in Texas and Louisiana, 4 La. L. Rev. 42 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Dainow,
Early Sources].
100. 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 248 (2d ed. 1898).
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only the fittest of mankind's institutions long survive. Hence, before
discarding this artifact of the civil law, we should search out the reasons
for its creation: what purposes, if any, it has served through the ages,
and what purposes it might serve today. It has been said that forced
heirship serves social, civic, and moral purposes. 10
A social purpose is served, in the authors' opinion, by helping to
maintain the cohesiveness of the family, an economic and cultural unit
of primary importance in society. There are social purposes behind all
law, and forced heirship encourages "family bonding." The expectancy
of an heir is what keeps the family together and ultimately interested
in the success of its members, since self-interest is the greatest motivator
of human behavior. Thus, the laws of forced heirship encourage loyalty
by family members. The family, in return, provides security by furnishing
its members a group identity; that identity should not be underestimated
in a society with great mobility. Each member participates and shares
with the others in the mutual prosperity of the family. Further, the
family imparts a sense of the continuity of life and responsibility to
future generations.
This "sense of connectedness among the generations has had an
important influence on human behavior."' 0 2 Today, "we have reached
the point where, as members of an interdependent world society, indeed
as a species, we urgently need once again to turn our thoughts to future
generations .
"..."10 As Professor Mary Ann Glendon observed in her
book The New Family and the New Property:
From this point of view, what is most arresting in what the
French and English family historians are beginning to say is
this: contrary to what lawyers have always believed, the dominant
common factor among all the pre-modern family property strategies was not mere family egotism or the desire to keep the
family heritage undivided. It was, rather, a "life-and-death proposition," a concern for the long-range survival of each family's
own unborn generations, in a time when the modern state did
not exist and political entities could not promise even bare
subsistence to their subjects.104
In the past in this country, children were born into a family which
accepted responsibility for the aged, the infirm, the infants, and even
those children who had grown up and moved away to start their own
branch of the family. Although this phenomenon is generally associated
with the farm families of America wherein it was universal, the fact is
sometimes overlooked that this sense of responsibility is also the very
foundation upon which the Irish, the Italians, the Germans, the Greeks,
101.
102.
103.
104.

Lemann, supra note 5, at 23.
M. Glendon, The New Family and the New Property 239 (1981).
Id. at 239-40.
Id. at 240 (footnote omitted).
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and all other immigrant groups adapted and fought their way to prosperity -and prominence in our country.
At a time when man is faced with threats to the survival of the
species and to life on this planet, it is once again time to assume
responsibility for future generations. Human beings are again beginning
"to think of themselves less as owners and more as life tenants of this
planet that is their habitat-here to enjoy it, tend it and pass it on
unwasted to those who come afterward, rather than leaving behind an
inheritance of poisoned ground, water and air."' 15 To acquire this mentality, individuals need to be supported and nourished "first, in small
family, work and political societies.' 0 6 Hence, the importance of encouraging family bonding is demonstrated. The family is necessary to
transmit to generation after generation the accumulations of knowledge,
experience, and values which are essential to the continuation of civilization.
Forced heirship encourages family bonding not only by creating an
expectancy, but also by according a legally protected status to each
child, as well as a measure of equality among children. Such rules
encourage family harmony and cooperative living within this basic unit.
Especially when the basic unit may be strained by the consequences of
successive marriages, rules bolstering the unit should be continued rather
than condemned. Furthermore, Louisiana has by legislation and jurisprudence established rules which in practice preclude review of a testator's capacity or state of mind. 0 7 Forced heirship provides a child's
only protection against the machinations of those who would influence
a sick, senile, or impressionable parent.
The civic purpose served by forced heirship has two bases: one practical, the other philosophical. Obviously, the restrictions imposed on
parents by forced heirship makes it more likely that the financial needs
of the child, regardless of his age or condition, will be satisfied to some
extent by the individual with primary responsibility for him. If a parent
failed to provide for his minor child and fulfill this responsibility, it
would, in all probability, devolve upon the state and, of course, ultimately upon the taxpayers.
Second, political observers were keenly aware that loyalty to the family
helps prevent despotism. 0 All authoritarian governments insist that the

105. Id. at 241.
106. Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
107. La. Civ. Code art. 1497.
108.
Equally important, he refused to see (and the British with him) that the real
alternative to Hitlerian Germany, something which would get the poison out of
the system, was not a reconstruction of Bismarckian GeFmany on Social Democratic lines, with an all-powerful paternalist state, a Leninist centralized direction
of nationalized industry, a huge, Prussian-style bureaucracy and a stress on
equality, uniformity and collectivity. The real antithesis to National Socialism
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state be the ultimate authority to which members of society owe allegiance, not the family. The family remains a bulwark against repressive
government and helps to assure that the state is subservient to the
people. If the family is the foundation of democratic, capitalistic nations,
it should be protected and defended. If the legitime serves a purpose
in this regard, it should not be discarded lightly. The authors believe
that the legitime is a part of the cement of "family bonding," which
assures the continued strength of the family unit.
Morally, forced heirship is an expression of the principle that a
parent is obligated to support, maintain, educate, and provide for the
future of his children. Balanced against this moral belief, its opponents
would place an illusory right to dispose of properly freely. But even during
the parents' lifetime this right of free disposition is restricted, as has
been discussed previously. Death renders less essential, not more, the
liberty to dispose of property.
In response to those who argue that the motivation and values
supplied by cultural traditions have been destroyed, Professor Glendon
states:
[T]he cross-lighting we receive from the history of families,
property and law affords some reassurance. It suggests that the

was individualism, a society where private arrangements took priority over public,
where the family was the favoured social unit and where the voluntary principle
was paramount ....
A society in which the family, as opposed to the political
party and the ideological programme, was the starting point for reconstruction,
was the answer to the totalitarian evil.
P. Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties, 580-81 (1983).
The original right of property can only be justified by the accident or merit
of prior occupancy; and on this foundation it is wisely established by the
philosophy of the civilians.
The personal title of the first proprietor must be determined by his death;
but the possession, without any appearance of change, is peaceably continued
in his children, the associates of his toil, and the partners of his wealth. This
natural inheritance has been protected by the legislators of every climate and
age, and the father is encouraged to persevere in slow and distant improvements,
by the tender hope that a long posterity will enjoy the fruits of his labour.
The principle of hereditary succession is universal . . . . A domestic monarch
. . . might . . . (chastise) an unworthy son by the loss of his inheritance, and
the mortifying preference of a stranger. But the experience of unnatural parents
recommended some limitation of their testamentary powers. A son, or, by the
laws of Justinian, even a daughter, could no longer be disinherited by their
silence . . . Unless a legitimate portion, a fourth part, had been reserved for
the children, they were entitled to institute an action or complaint of inofficious
testament-to suppose that their father's understanding was impaired by sickness
or age, and respectfully to appeal from his rigorous sentence to the deliberate
wisdom of the magistrate.
2 E. Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire 86-89, in 41 Great Books
of the Western World (Encyclopedia Britannica ed. 1952).
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world's reserves of values may indeed be greater than its supplies
[Tihe
of fossil fuels, as well as more essential to survival ....
older modes of behavior and attitudes about families, property

and law referred to above have been merely latent; they have
survived here and there. 0 9
Louisiana's forced heirship is just such an example. It is an expression
of the moral values of society and the tradition in which they are rooted.
Potential Modifications of Forced Heirship
Even though the authors' conclusion is that the institution of forced
heirship be retained, there are various modifications of the system that
it is appropriate to consider. Some of the suggested variations have been
proposed in the past, and others are of more recent vintage. Generally,
the three categories subject to potential legislative modification are the
extent of the reserve, the class of persons designated as forced heirs,
and the rules regulating disinherison.
As to the extent of the reserve, at least three variations are possible.
One modification would be to provide a discretionary reserve, the size
of which would depend entirely upon what a court decides concerning
the "needs" of an heir, or what constitutes "reasonable financial provision" for an heir. Such a system would be similar to those of New
Zealand" ° and England."' Interestingly, there is historical evidence that

109. M. Glendon, supra note 102, at 244.
110. The system is described in Dainow, Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia
and Canada, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1107 (1938) and LeVan, Alternatives to Forced Heirship,
52 Tul. L. Rev. 29, 37-38 (1977).
Ill. M. Glendon, State Law and Family: Family Law in Transition in the United
States and Western Europe 280-82 (1977). In describing the 1975 legislation enacting the
Provision for Family and Dependents Act, Professor Glendon made the following observation:
Recognizing the anomaly that existing English law was according greater rights
to a divorced spouse than to a surviving spouse, the Law Commission proposed
that the court's power to award family provision for dependents on death should
be as wide as its power to award provision upon divorce. Thus, the new system
is still a system of discretionary court awards, but no longer limits a surviving
spouse to "maintenance". He or she can request "reasonable financial provision," on the analogy of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973, and the court
has the same power as under that Act to award periodic payments or a lump
sum or a combination of both, under guidelines similar to those of the 1973
Act. The new act, like the former Family Provision Act, applies to situations
both of intestate and testate succession, and like the most recent American
legislation, it provides for means to reach inter vivos transfers in attempted
evasion of the proposed provisions.
Id. at 281 (footnote omitted).
For a representative example of the interpretation and application of the 1975 legislation,
see Re Coventry, 3 All Eng. L. Reports 815 (App. Ct. 1979). For a description of the
1938 legislation restricting testamentary freedom, see Dainow, Limitations on Testamentary
Freedom in England, 25 Cornell L. Q. 337 (1940).
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prior to the end of the seventeenth century, English law required a fixed
percentage "legitime" in that country's brief experiment with free testation." 2 A concomitant of a discretionary reserve would be a maximum
limitation upon what the heir could receive; the Roman law once provided for children who were not mentioned in their parents' will, or

13
who were given less than a designated portion of their parents' estates.
Under Roman law, however, the heir for whom no provision was made
had to allege unjust disinherison, rather than "need." Furthermore, the

necessity of allegations of unjust disinherison encouraged attacks upon

the presumed insanity or unjustness of the testator, which Louisiana
4
has historically abhorred."
A discretionary reserve presents the obvious difficulty of uncertainty,
both as to the extent of the claim made by the heir against the estate
and the likelihood of its success. No difficulty yet encountered by the
present scheme of forced heirship, as complex as it is, rivals the problems
presented by a discretionary reserve. With a system that creates vagaries
of claims which ultimately depend on judicial discretion, negotiation and
compromise between attorneys for the claimants and those representing
the estate of the deceased would be extremely difficult. The result would

be increased litigation. Unlike a fixed percentage, the discretionary re112. See 2 F.Pollock & F. Maitland, supra note 100, at 308, 348-56.
We have been speaking as though a man might by his will dispose of all his
chattels. But in all probability it was only the man who left neither wife nor
child who could do this. We have every reason to believe that the general law
of the thirteenth century sanctioned some such scheme as that which obtained
in the province of York until the year 1692 and which obtains in Scotland at
this present time. . . . If he leaves both wife and child, then the division is
tripartite; the wife takes a share, the child or children a share, while the remaining
third is governed by the will; we have "wife's part," "bairns' part," and
"dead's part." Among themselves children take equal shares; the son is not
preferred to the daughter; but the heir gets no share unless he will collate the
inheritance that has descended to him, and every child who has been "advanced"
by the testator must bring back the advancement into hotchpot before claiming
a bairn's right.
Id.at 348-49.
To the modern Englishman our modern law, which allows the father to leave
his children penniless, may seem so obvious that he will be apt to think it
deep-rooted in our national character. But national character and national law
react upon each other, and law is sometimes the outcome of what we must call
accidents. Had our temporal lawyers of the thirteenth century cared more than
they did about the law of chattels, wife's part, bairns' part and dead's part
might at this day be known south of the Tweed.
Id.at 355-56.
113. W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 321-24
(2d ed. 1932).
114. Id. at 327-31; La. Civ. Code art. 1497. "Proof of captation is prohibited not
because captation is socially desirable but because, as a policy consideration, it was
considered better to protect the innocent legatee from spurious attacks than to deprive
the guilty one of his legacy." Note, Donations-Testaments-Captation Under Article
1492, 24 La. L. Rev. 925, 929 (1964).
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serve does not have the "merit of serving as a framework for private
ordering" of the financial claims of the parties "by enabling the spouses
to know what the likely result will be if their affairs are settled by a
judge."" ' 5 Even an opponent of the present structure of forced heirship
who has considered the alternative of a discretionary reserve has said:
To settle for family maintenance is to place in our courts the
115. Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 La. L. Rev. 1551, 1553 (1984).
Although directed toward discretionary property distribution, Professor Glendon's comments likewise pertain to a discretionary maintenance allowance:
In the first place, the system of discretionary distribution, because of inconsistency in results among apparently similar cases, is widely perceived as unfair
by litigants. Second, this unpredictability of outcome means the law in this area
is not serving one of its most important purposes: to furnish a basis for
negotiation and future planning by the parties. This is especially important in
view of the fact that over ninety percent of divorce cases are settled by agreement.
Third, these laws and their guidelines offer the opportunity for, and even
encourage, abuse of the litigation and negotiation processes more than do systems
of fixed rules . . . : In sum, the existing law in most states throws divorcing
spouses-and their children-into a lottery whose outcome greatly depends on
the luck of the judicial draw and the competence of counsel, and in which the
only sure winners are the lawyers.
Id. at 1556.
In commenting upon the institution of forced heirship, she observed:
If, as is expected, this type of question becomes increasingly urgent in the near
future, legislators may be tempted, or induced, as they were in the case of
property division upon divorce, to turn the matter over to the judiciary for
resolution by the exercise of discretion in each individual case. This was the
choice made by England (following the example of New Zealand) in 1938. Given
the American experience with discretionary distribution on divorce, however, it
would be unfortunate indeed if recourse to this type of solution were to turn
the relatively smooth-functioning of the law of decedents' estates into another
field day for matrimonial lawyers. If comparative law teaches anything it is the
necessity to be aware of the context of legal rules and institutions. Anyone who
advocates the importation of the English system of applications for discretionary
maintenance or allowances from a decedent's estate by disappointed relatives
and others should ponder very carefully the differences between the English and
the American judiciary and legal professions, as well as the differences in their
law of civil procedure. A legal device that may operate in a relatively unobjectionable manner in a system like England's where most civil disputes are
tried without a jury, where discovery is restricted, and where the expenses of
litigation are borne by the losing party, can and probably would turn into a
source of expensive and bitter litigation in the United States.
As with property division upon divorce, the alternative to a system of judicial
discretion is some system of fixed rules. The latter has characterized the traditional approach of the civil law systems and Louisiana to the protection of
children against disinheritance. It may be too soon for the common-law states
to accept the idea of a forced share for children as a way of dealing with
problems generated by the formation of successive families, but certainly Louisiana, which already has the forced heirship institution, should think long and
hard before giving it up or further impairing it just as it seems to be responsive
to a newly emerging and important social need.
Id. at 1572-73 (footnotes omitted).
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power to vary estate plans, even where the estate plan is intestacy. Given Louisianians' proclivity to litigate, the legions of
lawyers added annually to the profession, and the almost in- evitable wounds that result from intrafamily squabbles over family property, the legislature must weigh carefully such a dramatic
16
alternative to forced heirship.'
With a fixed percentage, it would be possible to vary the designated
percentages with the size of the estate, so that in a large estate the
testator could have greater freedom to dispose of property and take
advantage of tax deductions. In fact, during the deliberations preceding
adoption of the French Code, Napoleon suggested such a "sliding scale":
"The First Consul suggested graduating the legitime according to the
size of the succession instead of the number of children. For example,
the father could be given the right to dispose of one-half his estate if
-it exceeded 1,000,000 francs; if less, he could only dispose of a child's
part."" 7 The proposal was ultimately rejected because "very few fortunes
exceed 100,000 francs ' " 8 and "the greatest disadvantage . . . was that
it would require an expensive and often uncertain appraisal."" 9 A proposal similarly dependent upon the size of the testator's estate has been
20
made more recently.
Another modification of the fixed percentage reserve would be to
restrict the type of property against which a forced heir may claim his
legitime. For example, the fixed percentage might be demandable only
against separate property of the deceased, which often is acquired largely
from the decedent's family by donation or inheritance.' 21 The fixed
percentage might be increased if the reserve were demandable only against
separate property. The concept of restricting the type of property against
which the reserve is demandable existed in the northern part of France;
the customary law derived the restriction from the Germanic concept
of collective family ownership. 22 Under the customary law, where there
was no ancestral property against which a forced heir could claim his
reserve, "a modification was introduced that in default of ancestral
property there should be substituted in its stead either the acquired
property or, in default of both, the movable property.' '1 23 Under Lou-

116. LeVan, supra note 65, at 48.
117. 12 P. Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux preparatoires du code civil 21 (Paris
1827), cited in Lemann, supra note 5, at 23.
118. Lemann, supra note 5, at 23.
119. Id.at 23-24.
120. "Why should not an estate of, say, less than $100,000 pass outright to the
surviving spouse by intestacy?" LeVan, supra note 65, at 48.
121. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2341.
122. See Dainow, Forced Heirship, supra note 99, at 672-75; see also J. Brissaud, A
History of French Private Law, 738-45 (1912).
123. Dainow, Forced Heirship, supra note 99, at 673.
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isiana matrimonial regimes law, since spouses have significant freedom
to change the classification of separate property to community property, 2 4 distinguishing the type of property subject to the reserve would
require restrictions, such as those enacted in northern France. The necessary restrictions would increase the uncertainty of the forced heirs'
claims and conceivably could impinge on the recently acquired freedom
of spouses to change the character of matrimonial property. These
consequences make the distinction in property subject to the reserve a
less desirable modification. Essentially, what would result would be the
substitution of a new complicated procedure for a familiar one.
Another alternative is to redefine the class of persons entitled to
the reserve. For example, forced heirs might be limited to minor children
of the deceased, based upon the assumption that such children are "in
need" and are generally supported by the parents' legal obligation to
support, maintain, and educate their children. This proposal, with its
arbitrary fixed percentage, assumes that all minor children have identical
need. The proposal is thus subject to the criticism that it is not responsive
to its underlying purpose, providing for a child "in need."
A "sliding scale" could be introduced so where the value of an estate
exceeds a fixed amount, the minor child could claim more than his
reserve. To be successful he would be required to prove "need" for an
additional sum to defray expenses projected for support, maintenance,
and education. To the extent that this proposal contains a discretionary
factor, uncertainty is introduced. The proposal's lack of logical consistency lies in the fact that a fixed percentage was never really founded
upon an assumption of the recipient's need. The reserve reflected the
familial obligation of the parent; forced heirship was never restricted
to minor children.
The category of forced heirs might be restricted to children, of
whatever age, who are "in need" when the parent dies rich. The marital
portion accorded to the survivor of a spouse who dies rich 2 5 could be
used as a model. The vicissitudes of potential claims of uncertain amounts
would multiply by the number of children surviving the deceased parent.
Another, more radical, proposal is to permit a grandchild to represent a living child if the child commits an act toward the parent which
is considered offensive. l 6 For example, if the child refuses to permit the
parent to visit the parent's grandchild, the grandparent could substitute
the grandchild for the child.' 27 The permitted substitution would serve
124. La. Civ. Code arts. 2329, 2330, 2343.1. Spouses may change the character of
property by matrimonial agreement or by transmutation agreement.
125. La. Civ. Code arts. 224, 227, 230.
126. La. Civ. Code arts. 2432-2437.
127. Representation is only permitted in instances where a descendant predeceases the
de cujus, since only persons deceased at the time of the death of the de cujus may be
represented. La. Civ. Code art. 886.
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the dual purpose of punishing the child and protecting the grandchild;

disinherison would not suffice in instances where the offensive child has
siblings. 128 If such a modification were adopted, the act committed by
the child should be an offense that continues until the deceased's death
without reconciliation between the parent and child, as the jurisprudence

has required for successful disinherison.
Probably the simplest modification is to amend the articles governing
the disinherison of forced heirs. If the argument is accepted that forced

heirship serves a civil, moral, and social function, then it should be
permissible to exclude a non-deserving child. The classification of nondeserving child should include not only the child who by the seriousness
of his acts proves himself ungrateful, but also the child society would
consider unworthy of receiving the benefits of an institution which serves
an important moral and societal purpose.
Recent legislative proposals suggest that liberalizing the grounds for
disinherison may be the most acceptable modification of forced heirship.
At the 1984 Legislative Session five bills were introduced to amend Civil
Code article 1621, which lists the grounds for disinherison of a child
by a parent. 2 9 All five failed to pass. 30 Three of the measures would
have permitted a parent to disinherit a child who had failed to com-

municate with the parent after reaching majority for a period of time
varying from one year to five years.' A condition is that the child
knew or should have known how to contact the parent.'32 The provision
was obviously patterned after Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.1, which
dispenses with the necessity of a parent's consent to the adoption of
his child 3 under certain circumstances. Difficulty in interpreting "failure
128. Since a grandchild could not represent a living parent who was disinherited, he
would be excluded by his aunts and uncles. The aunts and uncles, being descendants of
the first degree, would exclude the grandchild, a descendant of the second degree. La.
Civ. Code arts. 888, 899.
129. La. Civ. Code arts. 1617-1624.
130. La. H.B. 503, 504, 638 & La. S.B. 12, 13 of the 1984 Reg. Sess. Telephone
interview with Andre LeBoeuf, Ass't Supervisor of Administrative Services, Louisiana
State Capitol, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Feb. 22, 1985).
131. La. H.B. 638, 1984 Reg. Sess. (1 year); La. H.B. 503 & La. S.B. 12, 1984 Reg.
Sess. (5 years).
132. La. H.B. 503 & La. S.B. 12, 1984 Reg. Sess.
133.
If the spouse of the petitioner is the legitimate parent of the child or if the
petitioner is the grandparent or grandparents of the child then the consent of
the other legitimate parent is not necessary when the spouse of the petitioner
or the grandparent or grandparents or the mother or the father have been
granted custody of the child by a court of competent jurisdiction, and if any
one of the following conditions exists:
(3) The other legitimate parent has refused or failed to visit, communicate,
or attempt to communicate with the child, without just cause, for a period of
two years.
La. R.S. 9:422.1 (1980).
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to communicate" may occur where the child argues that he was justified
in his failure to act in accordance with the statute because of his
circumstances. 3 4 Under 9:422.1, the courts have had to consider whether
37
incarceration,' 35 drug addiction, 3 6 or the emotional state of the parent
constitutes justification for failure to comply with court orders of support, another circumstance under which a parent's consent to an adoption
is not required. The same questions exist where the failure to communicate with the child is without just cause.
Two other bills proposed a ground for disinherison of a child where
the child unreasonably refused his parent permission to visit his grandchild for one year. 38 As mentioned earlier, a more successful remedy
would be to permit the parent to substitute the grandchild for the child.
This solution would serve as an effective punishment of the offending
child, yet protect the innocent grandchild.
Additional grounds for disinherison could be borrowed from Roman
and Spanish law. For example, grounds for disinherison might exist
where the child has "heaped gross and opprobrious insults"' 39 upon his
parent; where the child is a malefactor and habitually associates with
criminals against the will of his parent; 40 or where the child does such
injury to the parent as to expose him "to the loss or deterioration of
the greater part of his estate.'1 4' These suggestions are not intended to
foreclose other possibilities.
In 1979 a Joint Legislative Subcommittee was created to study forced
heirship and illegitimates' rights. One of the proposals submitted was
to liberalize the grounds for disinherison under Article 1621. As a
substitute for the list which presently appears in that article, the following
was suggested: "The just causes for which parents may disinherit their
children are where he has seriously failed in the duties imposed upon
him by law toward the parent or the latter's family or where he has
been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude."'14 2 Objection
134. See, e.g., Adoption of Latiolais, 384 So. 2d 377 (La. 1980).
135. State v. Jones, 373 So. 2d 1331 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); In re Brannon, 340
So. 2d 654 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
136. In re Daboval, 377 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 380 So.
2d 101 (La. 1980).
137. State ex rel. Haynes, 368 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
375 So. 2d 103 (La. 1979).
138. La. H.B. 504 & La. S.B. 13, 1984 Reg. Sess. (not passed).
139. Constitutions of Justinian, Eighth Collection: The Civil Law 41 (S. P. Scott
trans. 1932); see also 2 Las Siete Partidas part. 6th, tit. 7, L. 4.
140. At Roman Law the cause for disinherison was expressed as follows: "Where, in
opposition to the will of his parents, the son associates with actors or buffoons, and
continues to do so, unless his parents belong to the same profession." Constitutions of
Justinian, supra note 139, at 42. In Las Siete Partidas, the same ground was expressed
in Law 5 as "[Tjhe father may disinherit his son, if the latter turn juggler against his
wish .... ." 2 Las Siete Partidas part. 6th, tit. 7, L. 5.
141. 2 Las Siete Partidas part. 6th, tit. 7, L. 4.
142. Joint Legislative Subcomm. Studying Forced Heirship and Illegitimates' Rights,
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was raised by committee members to the inclusion of conduct directed
toward members of the parent's family. Acts which permit the parent
to disinherit his child ordinarily involve those that are seriously disrespectful, for the child by law owes a duty of respect to his parent
regardless of his age. 43 The difficulties encountered in interpreting the
words "seriously," "duties imposed by law," and "moral turpitude"
resulted in the rejection of the proposal to liberalize disinherison. However, as an intermediate position, the grounds for disinherison might be
simplified by consolidating the first nine grounds presently appearing in
Article 1621,' 44 substituting: "If the child has been guilty of cruel treatment of his parent, whether physical or mental." Comments could reflect
the intention to consolidate the current grounds for disinherison, and
encourage reliance by analogy on the jurisprudence interpreting Article
138 on what conduct constitutes mental or physical cruel treatment
sufficient to obtain a separation from bed and board. 4 '
Another proposal presented to the legislative subcommittee in 1979
was to shift the burden of persuasion in an action to disinherit from
the heirs of the testator to the heir who has been disinherited. The
proposal was to amend Article 1624 to read as follows:
The testator must express in the will for what reasons he disinherited his forced heirs or any of them, and the forced heir
Alternative Suggestions for Amendment of the Law of Successions 4 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Joint Subcomm., Alternative Suggestions].
143. La. Civ. Code art. 215.
144.
1. If the child has raised his or her hand to strike the parent, or if he or
she has acutally struck the parent; but a mere threat is not sufficient.
2. If the child has been guilty, towards a parent, of cruelty, of a crime or
grievous injury.
3. If the child has attempted to take the life of either parent.
4. If the child has accused a parent of any capital crime, except, however,
that of high treason.
5. If the child has refused sustenance to a parent, having means to afford
it.
6. If the child has neglected to take care of a parent become insane.
7. If the child refused to ransom them, when detained in captivity.
8. If the child used any act of violence or coercion to hinder a parent from
making a will.
9. If the child has refused to become security for a parent, having the means,
in order to take him out of prison . ...
La. Civ. Code art. 1621.
145.
Separation from bed and board may be claimed reciprocally for the following
causes: . . . "3. On account of habitual intemperance of one of the married
persons, or excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages of one of them towards the
other, if such habitual intemperance, or such ill-treatment is of such a nature
as to render their living together insupportable ....
"
La. Civ. Code art. 138. See also Comment, The Degree of Cruelty Necessary to Justify
Separation from Bed and Board in Louisiana, 16 La. L. Rev. 533 (1956).
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so disinherited is obliged to prove he is not guilty of the cause
stipulated by the testator for disinherison or that he was reconciled with the 46testator after the act which constituted cause
for disinherison.1

Requiring the forced heir to move forward with the evidence may not
accomplish much if what he is required to prove is negative-that he
never treated the testator cruelly, for example. However, if the grounds

for disinherison were the failure of the disinherited heir to act, such as
his failure to communicate with the testator parent for a period of
years, shifting of the burden of persuasion would be appropriate and
47
would make disinherison easier.1
Furthermore, the legislature could reconsider the doctrine of reconciliation, which was jurisprudentially created as a defense to an action
to disinherit. 48 Legislation could delineate the essence of reconciliationwhat type of conduct between parent and child will be required to
eliminate the ground for disinherison stated in the parent's testament.
The legislature could even provide that the reconciliation, just as the
disinherison, would have to be evidenced by reference to the conduct

in some particular form. 49 Because disinherison is in derogation of what
the law assumes to be the natural affection a parent has for his child

and the respect owed by a child to his parent, stricter formalities might
apply for disinherison than reconciliation. Furthermore, requiring the
reconciliation to be in writing may seem inconsistent with the article on

unworthiness of an heir, which permits an implied reconciliation between
the deceased and an unworthy child. 50 Inconsistency results because two
of the three grounds for unworthiness' 5' are the most serious of the
146. Joint Subcomm., Alternative Suggestions, supra note 142, at 5. "The testator
must express in the will for what reasons he disinherited his. forced heirs or any of them,
and the other heirs of the testator are moreover obliged to prove the facts on which the
disinherison is founded; otherwise it is null." La. Civ. Code art. 1624.
147. For one of the few reported instances in which the testator was successful in
disinheriting a child, see Succession of Chaney, 413 So. 2d 936 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
148. Successions of Lissa, 198 La. 129, 3 So. 2d 534 (1941); see also La. Civ. Code
art. 1710.
149. See La. Civ. Code art. 1618.
150.
Suits to establish the unworthiness of heirs can not be sustained, if there has
been a reconciliation or pardon on the part of him to whom the injury was
done.
If, therefore, a father has full knowledge of an injury done to him by one
of his children, and dies without disinheriting him, though he has sufficient
time to make his will since he has had this knowledge, he will be considered
as having forgiven the injury, and the child can not be deprived of the succession
of his father on account of unworthiness.
La. Civ. Code art. 975.
151. The first two categories of unworthiness are:
1. Those who are convicted of having killed, or attempted to kill, the deceased;
and in this respect they will not be the less unworthy, though they may have
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eleven causes for disinherison. Therefore, unworthiness is considered the
more serious disqualification, involving the most offensive conduct of
an heir.
There are other possible modifications of forced heirship. The preceding discussion illustrates some of the myriad of possibilities, and

gives a brief evaluation of the proposed modifications.
Conclusion

The legitime survives in a modified form because it continues to
serve important societal purposes. Actually, it may serve better the
common good of citizens of this state today than it has in a number

of years. The authors, who favor its retention, do accept the possibility
that it may be further modified, particularly in the area of disinherison,
to tailor more closely the functioning of the institution to its purposes.

Fundamentally, however, it embodies a universally accepted moral principle, historically synthesized, that is peculiarly adapted to current social

and moral problems.
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

In an admonition on the standard of persuasion required to overcome
the presumption of testamentary capacity, Professor Alston Johnson has
suggested that a "legislative statement would probably be of little assistance, so the judiciary must be much more careful in assessing the
standard of proof required in such cases and in re-evaluating some of
the supposed holdings which continue to be cited."' 52 The Louisiana
Supreme Court recently reexamined the standard to resolve the conflicting
jurisprudence.' 53 Rather than impose the burden of proving beyond a

been pardoned after their conviction.
2. Those who have brought against the deceased some accusation found
calumnious, which tended to subject the deceased to an infamous or capital
punishment.
La. Civ. Code art. 966. Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 1621.
The just causes for which parents may disinherit their children are eleven in
number, to wit:

2. If the child has
grievous injury.
3. If the child has
4. If the child has
that of high treason.

been guilty, towards a parent, of cruelty, of a crime or
attempted to take the life of either parent.
accused a parent of any capital crime, except, however,
La. Civ. Code art. 1621.

152. Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Successions and Donations, 44
La. L. Rev. 553, 566 (1983).
153. Succession of Lyons, 452 So. 2d 1161, 1164 (La. 1984).
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reasonable doubt that the testator lacked a sound mind, the court
required clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of
testamentary capacity.

54

In Succession of Lyons, the evidence concerning the testator's capacity, which consisted mostly of testimony of those interested in the
outcome, was contradictory. Impartial evidence consisted of the attending
nurses' notes on the day of execution of the testament and the days
immediately preceding and following execution, and the attending physician's testimony. The nurses' notes indicated that even though the
testator had fever, he was on the various occasions "easily aroused,"
"alert," and "alert and oriented."' On the other hand, the doctor
testified that he had trouble communicating with the testator, and that
in his opinion the testator was "not able to understand business transactions such as the disposition of his property at the time."'15 6 The court
apparently considered the fact that the testator had signed consent forms
for emergency treatment and operative procedures with the doctor as
casting "some doubt on his [doctor's] assertion that decedent lacked
57

understanding." 1
Recognizing that some courts had adopted the stringent criminal
standard of persuasion to overcome the presumption of testamentary
capacity,' the court commented, "a criminal standard of proof . . .
is inappropriate and can lead to anomalous results."' 51 9 Although the
criminal standard of persuasion was considered "inappropriate," the
ordinary standard in civil cases was likewise rejected since strong policy
considerations are involved when testamentary capacity is disputed.'16
Quoting from Kingsbury v. Whitaker,161 the court compared the taking
' 62
of property from legatees to "post-mortem robbery.'
154.
155.

Id. at 1165-66.
Id. at 1166. Nurses' notes were also used in Succession of Dubos, 422 So. 2d

444, 447 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), to refute testimony concerning lack of testamentary
capacity.
156. 452 So. 2d at 1166.
157. Id. It seems to the authors that capacity of the patient to sign his name to a
consent form for treatment is distinguishable from capacity of the patient to exercise the
mental functions necessary to formulate dispositions of property remaining at his death.
Furthermore, the urgency of the execution of the consent form, as well as the consequences
of failure to execute it, distinguish it from the drafting and execution of a will.
158. McCormick on Evidence § 341, at 962 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); see cases cited
in Succession of Lyons, 452 So. 2d at 1164.
159. 452 So. 2d at 1164.
160. Id. at 1165. Examples of other instances in civil cases in which clear and convincing
evidence is required are attorney disciplinary proceedings, suits to annul transactions
induced by fraud, suits to establish filiation to a deceased parent, and instances where a
person is attempting to overcome the presumption that property possessed during marriage
by one spouse is community property. Id.
161. 32 La. Ann. 1055 (1880).
162. 452 So. 2d at 1165.
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An example of the anomalous results that have been reached by
courts of appeal is Successions of Collins v. Hebert.163 In that case the
medical testimony of a board certified neuropathologist 64 established
that the testator had "destroyed 50 to 90 per cent of his brain cells by
drinking,' ' 65 and that he sometimes "consumed 80 bottles of liquor per
month.' 166 Yet the third circuit court of appeal held that the opponents
of the will alleging testamentary incapacity had failed to overcome the
presumption of capacity by proof of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judge Watson concurred, observing that "the jurisprudence has placed
an almost impossible burden on those who attack a will on the basis
asserted in this case.' ' 67 Not surprisingly, Justice Watson was the author
of the majority opinion in Succession of Lyons.
Although the articulated standard of persuasion is less than "beyond
a reasonable doubt," it is, as Professor Johnson describes, "still substantial,' '1 68 and "even that slightly more lenient standard is more than
most opponents can achieve."'' 69 As described in Lyons, "The existence
of the disputed fact must be highly probable, that is much more probable
than its nonexistence."' 70 The burden of persuasion rests upon the party
challenging the presumption to convince the fact-finder that his proposed
7
conclusion is much more correct than the presumed one.' '
The disputed fact is whether the testator understood the nature of
the testamentary acts and appreciated their effects. 72 Thus, rebuttal of
the presumption of sanity is not exactly proof of insanity. Under the
jurisprudence, it is unnecessary to prove that the testator be found
"completely 'mad' or depraved or notoriously insane."'' 73 Applying the

163. 377 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 15 (La. 1980).
164. Medical testimony has been received skeptically in some cases, particularly where
conflicting, as in McCarty v. Trichel, 217 La. 444, 46 So. 2d 621 (1950); Successions of
Collins v. Hebert, 377 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 15
(La. 1980). In Kingsbury v. Whitaker, 32 La. Ann. 1055 (1880), the medical testimony
was too general to be helpful, and in Succession of Lyons, 452 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1984),
too inconsistent. The court considered the doctor's testimony suspicious in Succession of
Dubos, 422 So. 2d 444 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), because he was a legatee under a prior
will, and a plaintiff challenging the validity of the second will. But see Succession of
Keel, 442 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Succession of Dixon v. Guzik, 269 So.
2d 323 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
165. Successions of Collins, 377 So. 2d at 520.
166. Id.at 519.
167. Id.at 520.
168. Johnson, supra note 152, at 565.
169. Id.
170. Lyons, 452 So. 2d at 1165.
171. See Turner v. Turner, 455 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1984) (describing the proof required
to rebut the presumption).
172. Succession of Moody, 227 La. 609, 80 So. 2d 93 (1955); Succession of Herson,
127 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
173. Succession of Dixon v. Guzik, 269 So. 2d 323, 325 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972);
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standard of persuasion imposed by Lyons, it is accurate to state that
the party alleging testamentary incapacity must prove that it is highly
probable that the
brain or other physical organ . . . which is the medium through
which the action of the mind is manifested is so diseased or
impaired as to make it an untrustworthy vehicle for the conveyance of the true wish or will of the testator, unbiased by
74
any delusion which may be the result of disease.
More succinctly, the question concerns the mental and emotional capacity
of the testator to deliberate knowledgeably and to make an unconfused
decision. 175
see also Succession of Mithoff, 168 La. 624, 122 So. 886 (1929). Such a description of
the state of mind of the testator conforms to general notions of incapacity, for not only
does insanity create incapacity, but also a "temporary derangement of intellect, whether
arising from disease, accident or other cause . . . creates an incapacity pending its duration
...
La. Civ. Code art. 1789. Planiol describes the state of mind of the testator as
follows:
No distinction is made between various kinds of insanity for the purpose of
applying Art. 901. The absence of mental capacity can be permanent (complete
insanity) or merely recurrent (phases of insanity alternating with lucid intervals),
or entirely accidental and isolated (effects of drunkenness, fever, accident causing
a temporary derangement). These different causes are unimportant. The only
essential element is that the disposing person failed to have clear or free mind
at the time he made his donation or will (Art. 901).
Imbecility resulting from senility is considered analogous to insanity. Although
the disposition in the will may be perfectly reasonable, it can be set aside on
the grounds that the testator did not have the required mental capacity.
3 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law pt. 2, no. 2874, at 410 (l1th ed. La. St. L.
Inst. trans. 1959) (footnotes omitted).
The proof can be made by all possible evidence, the court of first instance
judging the facts autonomously. Sometimes the facts are very delicate. Obviously
the court can not set the will aside unless it does not seem to be a product of
reasonable volition. In that regard the courts have been quite conservative. A
simple derangement which affects only the speculative phase of intellect can still
leave the person sufficiently capable to administer his estate, and thus capable
to testate.
Id. no. 2876, at 411 (footnotes omitted).
174. Succession of Bey, 46 La. Ann. 773, 789, 15 So. 297, 302 (1894).
175. Omitted from this definition appearing in Succession of Dixon, 269 So. 2d at
325, is reference to the testator's capacity to act independently. In that case there was
evidence that the testatrix had copied a will furnished by her daughter-in-law, named as
universal legatee in the testament. Proof of inability to act independently might include
proof of undue influence, which is prohibited by Civil Code article 1497. Permitting such
proof to establish testamentary incapacity "completely undermines the purpose of this
article, which is to protect against divulgence of scandalous matter and multitudinous
attacks on testaments." Note, supra note 114, at 929. The policy underlying the prohibition
was that "it was considered better to protect the innocent legatee from spurious attacks
than to deprive the guilty one of his legacy." Id. at 929. Furthermore, those who needed
protection from such "undue influence" were protected by the institution of forced heirship
under Civil Code article 1493.
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Applying this new standard of persuasion to the facts of individual
cases is unlikely to have tremendous practical impact. Considering its
application to the facts in Succession of Lyons, it should rarely change

the results even in cases utilizing the criminal standard of persuasion.

76

Maybe that is as it should be. At least the newly articulated standard
does comply with the ordinary rules of evidence governing civil litigation,
which has theoretical appeal; the practical result is that few cases will
be decided differently under the new standard.'
Thus, the sanctity
accorded to testaments by the jurisprudence, as an expression of the
deceased's intentions concerning distribution of his property, will be
safeguarded.

176. See, e.g., Succession of Lambert, 185 La. 416, 169 So. 453 (1936); Succession
of Mithoff, 168 La. 624, 122 So. 886 (1929); Succession of Bey, 46 La. Ann. 773, 15
So. 297 (1894); Succession of Price v. Price, 448 So. 2d 839 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984);
Succession of Dubos, 422 So. 2d 444 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Succession of Herson,
127 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961). In Kingsbury v. Whitaker, in reversing the lower
court's judgement annulling the will of the deceased because of lack of capacity, the
court stated that the will contained "no contradictions, no extravagence, not a sentence,
not a word indicating that it was the offspring of a 'mind diseased.' " 32 La. Ann. 1055,
1056 (1880). Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 1788
6, which refers to onerous contracts, with
id.
8, referring to donations, and id.
19, referring specifically to testaments. But see
Successions of Collins v. Hebert, 377 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
379 So. 2d 15 (La. 1980).
177. Cases representative of successful challenges to testamentary capacity include
Succession of Keel, 442 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) and Succession of Dixon
v. Guzik, 269 So. 2d 323 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972). In the former case the decedent was
hospitalized, disoriented, unable to sign the will himself and unresponsive; in the latter
case the deceased was declared senile, placed in a nursing home, and the daughter-in-law
furnished her a copy of the will. In both instances the medical testimony was strong and
consistent with lack of testamentary capacity. See also Succession of Riggio, 405 So. 2d
513 (La. 1981).

